



USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER
CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Issue No. 298, 24 October 2003

Articles & Other Documents:

[Smallpox Still an Ideal Bioterror Agent, Experts Say](#)

[Pakistan, Saudi Arabia In Secret Nuke](#)

[North Korea Rebuffs U.S. Security Offer](#)

[Pakistan Agrees To Station Nuclear Weapons, Long-Range Missiles In Saudi Arabia; European, Indian Targets Within Reach](#)

[Israeli General Says Saudis Seek To Buy Pakistan Nukes](#)

[The Mullahs And The Bomb](#)

[Inquiry Faults Intelligence On Iraq](#)

[Iran Discloses Nuclear Activities](#)

[U.N. Pushing Unconventional Weapons Ban](#)

[Iran Will Allow U.N. Inspections Of Nuclear Sites](#)

[CIA Declined Intelligence, Former Official Says](#)

[House Team To Visit N. Korea](#)

[Bush Hails Joint Effort On N. Korea](#)

[Iran Still Has Nuclear Deadline, U.S. Says](#)

[How North Korea Got The Bomb](#)

[Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet on the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate \(NIE\) on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction](#)

[Who Is General Cao?](#)

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established here at the Air War College in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved

Smallpox Still an Ideal Bioterror Agent, Experts Say

Mon October 20, 2003 12:51 PM ET

GENEVA (Reuters) - Potential clandestine stocks, inadequate emergency planning and lapsed vaccinations mean the highly contagious smallpox virus remains an ideal biological terror weapon, disease experts said Monday. Eradicated in 1979, the smallpox virus now officially only exists in a freezer at the United States' Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta and at the Russian virology institute in Novosibirsk.

But secret stocks may lie in several other countries and could be used to launch a deadly bioterror attack, experts told reporters before the start of a two-day conference in Geneva supported in part by vaccine maker Acambis.

"I am not so naive as to believe we only have two repositories in the world," said Ken Alibek, a professor at George Mason University who defected from the former Soviet Union in 1992 after working on the anthrax virus.

The United States has said Iran, Libya and North Korea -- as well as the now ousted Iraqi administration of Saddam Hussein -- were potential sources of biological agents, especially smallpox, for terrorists.

"In the 21st century, we have no doubt that we will see new attempts to use biological agents for attacks," said Peter Jahrling, an adviser to the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute. "How soon and what agent we don't know."

Scientists have noted that since the end of a World Health Organization campaign to eradicate smallpox, vaccination programs have not always been maintained.

They say some 90 percent of the world's population is susceptible to the virus.

"Is it the ideal weapon? Unfortunately the answer might be yes," said Riccardo Wittek, an associate professor at Lausanne University. The disease had a fatality rate of around 25 percent and immunity was close to zero, he said. Disseminated through the air and on clothing, smallpox spreads fast but is difficult to diagnose as it incubates for around 10 days before causing fever and lesions.

Jahrling said the United States had made rapid progress in terms of diagnostics in the wake of the September 11 attacks and anthrax scare in 2001 and now has access to some 300 million doses of smallpox vaccinations.

"We have come light years in the last three years," he said.

<http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=healthNews&storyID=3649415>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times

October 22, 2003

Pg. 1

Iran Will Allow U.N. Inspections Of Nuclear Sites

By Elaine Sciolino

TEHRAN, Oct. 21 — Iran agreed Tuesday, after months of resistance, to accept stricter international inspections of its nuclear sites and to suspend production of enriched uranium, which can be used to develop nuclear weapons.

But Tehran gave no indication when it would suspend uranium enrichment or sign, ratify and carry out an additional agreement under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 that would allow surprise inspections of its nuclear installations.

The accord was completed in Tehran during an unusual visit by three European foreign ministers, Dominique de Villepin of France, Jack Straw of Britain and Joschka Fischer of Germany.

The ministers expressed hope that it would help defuse a diplomatic crisis that pitted Iran against the International Atomic Energy Agency and, increasingly, the world because of concerns that Iran is determined to become a nuclear power.

In a news conference with the three ministers, Hassan Rowhani, a powerful middle-level cleric who has emerged as Iran's chief negotiator during the current crisis, said the one-and-a-half-page agreement would first have to be approved by Iran's elected Parliament.

He emphasized that the suspension of uranium enrichment would be for an "interim period."

In Washington, the State Department reacted skeptically to the agreement, with officials privately voicing concerns that Tehran would not fully comply. Officials there only grudgingly praised the work of their European colleagues.

"Frankly, I'd say there's a good reason for healthy skepticism about what Iran will actually do, as opposed to what it says," one senior department official said.

The international terms for compliance include unfettered access by officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency — the United Nations body that monitors nuclear programs around the world — to weapons development sites, as well as chemical samplings from places where enriched uranium suitable for weapons is being produced.

Bush administration officials dismissed the notion that a less confrontational approach by the Europeans had yielded more tangible results than the administration's policy of ultimatums. They insisted that the agreement merely buttressed the American policy, and said they had kept in touch with the Europeans throughout the initiative.

"The European mission didn't give the Iranians any daylight," the senior State Department official said. "I wouldn't call it a deal, because the issues that concern us weren't subject for compromise."

Still, the agreement was a victory for the Europeans and the culmination of two and a half months of diplomatic effort to convince Iran that it would be punished by an undivided world community if it did not comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency's strict demands.

It also underscores the emergence of a potentially powerful European alliance in the aftermath of the American-led Iraq war and occupation among Britain, which supported the war, and France and Germany, which did not.

As an incentive to Iran, the agreement recognized its right "to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy" in accordance with the nonproliferation treaty. Indeed, Mr. Rowhani said Europe and Iran were entering a "new phase" in which Europe was committed to help Iran develop its nuclear energy program and to seek ways to increase trade ties with Iran.

A policy that uses incentives in the nuclear field puts the European position at odds with that of the United States. The Clinton and Bush administrations have opposed Russia's project with Iran to build nuclear reactors at Bushehr on the Persian Gulf, arguing that Iran — a major oil producer — does not need nuclear energy and that activities at the site could indirectly help a nuclear weapons program.

In making the pledges, Iran seems to have been motivated primarily by a fear of international isolation and sanctions. Last month, in a vote that united Americans, Europeans and others, the 35-nation governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency ordered Iran to prove by Oct. 31 that it has no secret weapons program or face unspecified consequences at the Security Council.

In the agreement on Tuesday, Iran also committed itself to answer probing questions posed by the agency last month about the recent discovery of highly enriched uranium at two sites. A senior Iranian official said his government felt it had to break the confrontational relationship over its nuclear program that had developed with foreign countries, adding that the agreement opened a process that would lead to more cooperation with Europe.

While Iranian officials deny that they are building nuclear weapons, the United States, France, Britain and Germany are convinced that they are. The atomic energy agency has turned up disturbing evidence in recent months that points to a secret weapons program.

Senior Bush administration officials said the United States was keen to avoid a confrontation with Iran. Senior European and American officials said that could have forced still another clash between the United States and its allies in the Security Council and discouraged Iranian concessions at a time when some extreme voices in Iran are calling for a withdrawal from the nonproliferation treaty.

Even worse, those officials said, it could have forced the United States to take punitive action against a powerful Islamic country of 65 million people in a strategically important location between Iraq and Afghanistan.

For those reasons, the United States reluctantly endorsed the European initiative, with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell telling his European counterparts that what the United States wanted was an unambiguous document that left no room for negotiation or second-guessing, European officials said.

The European initiative grew out of a letter drafted by France and sent by the three ministers to Iran's foreign minister, Kamal Kharrazi, in August. It urged Iran to adopt a protocol to the nonproliferation treaty that provides for intrusive inspections on short notice, and to halt its uranium enrichment program.

In return, the letter acknowledged Iran's right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and raised the possibility of cooperation on technology, without specifically pledging help with a civilian nuclear energy program.

The agreement on Tuesday came swiftly, apparently enjoying the support of conservatives as well as reformers in Iran's divided leadership.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/22/international/middleeast/22IRAN.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Times

October 22, 2003

Pg. 1

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia In Secret Nuke Pact

By Arnaud de Borchgrave, The Washington Times

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan — Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have concluded a secret agreement on "nuclear cooperation" that will provide the Saudis with nuclear-weapons technology in exchange for cheap oil, according to a ranking Pakistani insider.

The disclosure came at the end of a 26-hour state visit to Islamabad last weekend by Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler, who flew across the Arabian Sea with an entourage of 200, including Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal and several Cabinet ministers.

Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, the pro-American defense minister who is next in line to the throne after the crown prince, was not part of the delegation.

"It will be vehemently denied by both countries," said the Pakistani source, whose information has proven reliable for more than a decade, "but future events will confirm that Pakistan has agreed to provide [Saudi Arabia] with the wherewithal for a nuclear deterrent."

As predicted, Saudi Arabia — which has faced strong international suspicion for years that it was seeking a nuclear capability through Pakistan — strongly denied the claim.

Prince Sultan was quoted in the Saudi newspaper Okaz yesterday saying that "no military agreements were concluded between the kingdom and Pakistan during [Prince Abdullah's] visit to Islamabad." Mohammad Sadiq, deputy chief of mission for Pakistan's embassy in Washington, also denied any nuclear deal was in the works. "That is totally incorrect," he said in a telephone interview. "We have a clear policy: We will not export our nuclear expertise."

But the CIA believes Pakistan already has shared its nuclear know-how, working with North Korea in exchange for missile technology.

A Pakistani C-130 was spotted by satellite loading North Korean missiles at Pyongyang airport last year. Pakistan, which is estimated to have between 35 and 60 nuclear weapons, said this was a straight purchase for cash and strongly denied a nuclear quid pro quo.

"Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia," the Pakistani source said, "see a world that is moving from nonproliferation to proliferation of nuclear weapons."

The Saudi rulers, who are Sunni Muslims, are believed to have concluded that nothing will deter the Shi'ite Muslims who rule Iran from continuing their quest for a nuclear weapons capability.

Pakistan, meanwhile, is concerned about a recent arms agreement between India, its nuclear archrival, and Israel, a longtime nuclear power whose inventory is estimated at between 200 and 400 weapons.

To counter what Pakistani and Saudi leaders regard as multiple regional threats, the two countries have decided to quietly move ahead with an exchange of free or cheap Saudi oil for Pakistani nuclear know-how, the Pakistani source said.

Pakistanis have worked as contract pilots for the Royal Saudi Air Force for the past 30 years. Several hundred thousand Pakistani workers are employed by the Gulf states, both as skilled and unskilled workers, and their remittances are a hard currency boon for the Pakistani treasury.

Prince Abdullah reportedly sees Saudi oil reserves, the world's largest, as becoming increasingly vulnerable over the next 10 years.

By mutual agreement, U.S. forces withdrew from Saudi Arabia earlier this year to relocate across the border in the tiny oil sheikdom of Qatar.

Saudi officials also are still chafing over a closed meeting — later well publicized — of the U.S. Defense Policy Board in 2002, where an expert explained, with a 16-slide Powerpoint presentation, why and how the United States should seize and occupy oil fields in the country's Eastern Province.

Several incidents have raised questions over the extent of Saudi-Pakistani cooperation in defense matters.

A new policy paper by Simon Henderson, an analyst with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, noted that Prince Sultan visited Pakistan's highly restricted Kahuta uranium enrichment and missile assembly factory in 1999, a visit that prompted a formal diplomatic complaint from Washington.

And a son of Prince Abdullah attended Pakistan's test-firing last year of its Ghauri-class missile, which has a range of 950 miles and could be used to deliver a nuclear payload.

President Bush was reported to have confronted Pervez Musharraf over the Saudi nuclear issue during the Pakistani president's visit to Camp David this summer, and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage raised the issue during a trip to Islamabad earlier this month, according to Mr. Henderson's paper.

"Apart from proliferation concerns, Washington likely harbors more general fears about what would happen if either of the regimes in Riyadh or Islamabad became radically Islamic," according to Mr. Henderson.

GlobalSecurity.org, a well-connected defense Internet site, found in a recent survey that Saudi Arabia has the infrastructure to exploit such nuclear exports very quickly.

"While there is no direct evidence that Saudi Arabia has chosen a nuclear option, the Saudis have in place a foundation for building a nuclear deterrent," according to the Web site.

Arnaud de Borchgrave, editor at large of The Washington Times, is editor at large of United Press International as well.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20031021-112804-8451r.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Times

October 22, 2003

Pg. 7

CIA Declined Intelligence, Former Official Says

By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times

The CIA and the Iraq Survey Group failed to pursue information that Iraq smuggled uranium to Iran five years ago, according to a former State Department official.

The former Reagan administration official, Michael Ledeen, said in an interview that the CIA also blocked the Pentagon from pursuing contacts with an Iranian informant who provided information that "saved lives" of U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

The reason the CIA did not want to pursue the leads or have any contacts with two Iranian exiles is that the information and meetings were brokered by Manucher Ghorbanifar, an Iranian exile who was a key figure in the 1980s Iran-Contra arms-for-hostages deal, Mr. Ledeen said.

Mr. Ledeen was a Pentagon and National Security Council staff consultant at the time.

"The CIA never spoke to the people who claim to have [smuggled the uranium] and never went to the people who had the information," said Mr. Ledeen, a counterterrorism adviser to President Reagan's first secretary of state, Alexander Haig. "There was no investigation of this."

Mr. Ledeen said David Kay, the CIA's representative to the Iraq Survey Group, searching for Saddam Hussein's hidden weapons, was told of the uranium smuggling and planned to probe it, but the CIA dissuaded the investigators from pursuing the lead.

Mr. Ledeen said he knows Mr. Ghorbanifar and views him as a credible source of valuable information about the inner workings of the Iranian government.

A man in Iraq identified only as "an Iraqi Shi'ite" learned of the uranium smuggling from several people involved in the Iraqi government effort, Mr. Ledeen said.

The Iraqi Shi'ite contacted Mr. Ghorbanifar, who in turn contacted Mr. Ledeen. The Iraqi was pursuing the information with the hope of getting a reward the U.S. government has announced it is offering to people who help find hidden arms.

The information came from several Iraqis who say they are suffering from radiation sickness as a result of handling an unspecified amount of uranium sent to Iran five years ago.

U.S. officials said the CIA is reluctant to investigate claims about uranium because of the recent furor over intelligence regarding reports of Saddam trying to buy uranium from Niger.

Regarding the Afghanistan intelligence, Mr. Ledeen said that in December 2001, two Pentagon officials met with another Iranian informant in Rome who provided detailed information on Iranian government activities against the United States in Afghanistan.

The information was used by the Pentagon to protect troops and conduct operations against al Qaeda and Taliban forces.

"The information saved American lives," Mr. Ledeen said.

A CIA spokesman denied Mr. Ledeen's claim on the uranium but admitted the agency does not trust Mr. Ghorbanifar.

"We aggressively pursue all legitimate leads on weapons of mass destruction," chief CIA spokesman Bill Harlow said.

"It is true that we have no interest in meeting Mr. Ghorbanifar since he long ago was proven to be a fabricator and someone who sought to peddle false information for financial gain," Mr. Harlow said.

Mr. Ghorbanifar was a central figure in the Reagan administration's covert operation to provide arms to Iran in exchange for Tehran's help in winning the release of U.S. hostages held by Muslim terrorists in Lebanon.

The operation led to resignations of senior officials and numerous congressional and legal investigations.

"I think the main reason [the CIA] didn't go look for these people [who claim to have smuggled the uranium] is because it was preferable not to find them," Mr. Ledeen said.

"But whatever their motives, the president is badly served by this kind of behavior."

A U.S. official said the CIA looked into the information but found nothing that would substantiate it.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20031021-104441-3039r.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times

October 22, 2003

North Korea Rebuffs U.S. Security Offer

By Reuters

SEOUL, South Korea, Wednesday, Oct. 22 — The official North Korean news agency published a commentary on Tuesday calling "laughable" an American offer to provide guarantees of multilateral security in exchange for the North's ending its nuclear weapons program.

President Bush said this week that he was willing to consider giving North Korea regional security guarantees, but not the bilateral nonaggression pact that it has sought.

The article from the news agency dismissed the offer.

"We have asked for the United States to stop its hostile policy and a bilateral treaty between North Korea and the United States, and not for some sort of security guarantee," said the agency. "It's laughable and doesn't deserve even any consideration that the United States gives a security guarantee on the condition that we drop our nuclear development."

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/22/international/asia/22NORT.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Times

October 22, 2003

Pg. 6

House Team To Visit N. Korea

By Associated Press

Members of Congress hope to meet with Kim Jong-il, North Korea's reclusive leader, during a rare visit to Pyongyang next week, the leader of the delegation said yesterday.

The trip, led by Rep. Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Republican, comes as President Bush promotes a plan in which the United States and four other nations would give North Korea written assurances that it won't be attacked in exchange for a promise to dismantle its nuclear program.

Mr. Weldon said the delegation will not negotiate on the administration's behalf, but he hopes it will put a "human face" on U.S.-North Korean relations. He said the bipartisan House delegation strongly supports the Bush administration's insistence that North Korea end its nuclear program.

"I'm not there to negotiate. We're there to simply explore ideas," he said.

Mr. Weldon said he hopes to visit the nuclear complex at Yongbyon, where spent fuel rods could be used to make nuclear bombs. U.S. intelligence officials believe North Korea has one or two nuclear bombs, and that the spent fuel rods could allow it to build several more.

Mr. Weldon and five members had visited Pyongyang from May 30 to June 1, but had not met with Mr. Kim. The group was the first U.S. delegation to visit the country since a nuclear standoff began last October.

Mr. Weldon said he has notified Bush administration officials about the trip, but did not seek their approval. He said administration officials have mixed views about the visit. On Monday, North Korea test-fired an antiship missile off its east coast as Mr. Bush and other leaders were attending an Asian summit in Thailand.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20031021-104441-4069r.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily

October 22, 2003

Pakistan Agrees To Station Nuclear Weapons, Long-Range Missiles In Saudi Arabia; European, Indian Targets Within Reach

Exclusive. Analysis. By Yossef Bodansky and Gregory R. Copley. With input from GIS (Global Information System) Stations Islamabad, Riyadh and Kuala Lumpur.

Pakistan has reached a secret but definitive agreement to station nuclear weapons on Saudi soil, fitted to a new generation of Chinese (PRC)-supplied long-range (4,000 to 5,000km) ballistic missiles which would be under Pakistani command, but clearly with some form of joint Saudi-Pakistani command and control.

The new systems would be able to reach European and Indian targets, increasing Saudi political influence in Europe and giving Pakistan the strategic depth it needs to have a second-strike capability against Indian nuclear capabilities. This radically changes the balance of power in South Asia.

Highly-reliable GIS/Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily sources in Islamabad and Riyadh reported on October 21, 2003, that Saudi Arabia's effective ruler, Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister 'Abdallah bin 'Abd al-'Aziz al Sa'ud, reached the agreement with Pakistan Pres. Pervez Musharraf and Pakistani Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali during the visit of the Saudi delegation to Pakistan October 18-20, 2003. The agreement is the culmination of a long and sustained series of Saudi requests to Pakistan. A significant, unreported one-on-one meeting between Pres. Musharraf and Crown Prince 'Abdallah in Kuala Lumpur, at the Organization for Islamic Conference (OIC) on October 15, 2003, was also significant in the process.

It was clearly the fact that the Saudi basing would give Pakistan the capability to credibly deter an Indian nuclear or conventional attack on Pakistan which was the decisive element for the Pakistani leadership. Pakistan's domestically-based nuclear capability is insufficient to deter the threat even of an overwhelming Indian military thrust into the country. However, the basing of an IRBM capability, with nuclear weapons, in Saudi Arabia, adds a complex second-strike capability to Pakistan's deterrence and bargaining power with India.

Pakistani Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali arrived in Tehran on October 21, 2003, for a three-day visit, ostensibly about trade, but the Pakistani Government wished to use the visit to explain the Saudi-Pakistani deal with Iranian officials, in order to ensure that Iran did not see the new arrangement as a threat to Iran. Iran is conscious of the fact that the 1987 Saudi CSS-2 acquisition was specifically designed to deter Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia. It was understood that, under the Saudi-Pakistani pact, the nuclear weapons deployed to Saudi Arabia would remain as Pakistani systems, and the new series of ballistic missiles — which would replace the existing Saudi CSS-2 missiles (2,800km+ range), provided by the PRC and based on the DF-3A — would be paid-for by Saudi Arabia while being marked as Pakistani systems. The new systems would have a range of at least 4,000km and possibly 5,000km.

Saudi Arabia acquired its CSS-2s in 1987, principally to counter potential threats from Iran. The Saudi systems, which were obsolescent even then, were fitted with conventional warheads, although it was believed that Saudi Arabia had developed chemical and/or biological warhead capabilities for the missiles. The Royal Saudi Air Force (Al Quwwat al Jawwiya al Malakiya as Sa'udiya) operates a total of 50 CSS-2 IRBMs, in two squadrons; one at al-Joffer, the other at Sulayel (the principal missile base). The CSS-2 is a road-transportable, liquid-fueled IRBM, and can be launched from either permanent launch pads or from portable launch stands, although the RSAF approach appears to be to base the systems at fixed sites.

It was understood that the new systems would replace the CSS-2s at al-Joffer and Sulayel. Ideally, according to the sources, the new systems would be solid-fuel missiles, although it was possible that a derivative of the DF-4 liquid-fueled system (4,750km range) could be obtained, surplus from PRC stocks as an interim measure. The DF-4 operates from fixed bases. No specific timetable was put on the proposed new deployment of Pakistani strategic systems in Saudi Arabia, but a DF-4 acquisition option could make the plan operational within a very short timeframe.

In about February 2002, Saudi workers began a major expansion program at Sulayel. By early March 2002, there were significant numbers of new buildings and fortified storage facilities. New facilities were also built at the nearby King Khalid Military City, to support the Sulayel expansion. New launch pads were created and, significantly, new fortified storage facilities were built for missiles which would be longer than the CSS-2s currently in service. Two underground facilities were also noted.

The implication of the Saudi-Pakistani deal is that it (a) gives Saudi Arabia more credibility and leverage in dealing with European states and the US; and (b) makes Saudi Arabia now a part of the threat matrix for India.

It was no coincidence that, during the three-day Saudi visit to Pakistan that Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud al-Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Sa'ud said in Islamabad on October 19, 2003, that Indian-Israel military cooperation was a "worrying element" which could unleash instability and arms race in the region. Speaking at a joint news conference with Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri, he addressed the recently-concluded defense supply agreement in Delhi among India, Israel and Russia, Prince Sa'ud said: "Indeed what we are hearing of this cooperation (Indo-Israel deal) is that it is aimed not at the good of the region, but to inflame the region, to further add to the arms race in the region." In the same context, he recalled how some Israeli think tanks demonstrated "similar sinister designs" in the Middle East concerning the "security of Israel". He observed: "It is a country of four-million or so people that believes its security extends from the Indus River to the Atlantic Ocean." The Saudi mission to Islamabad — the first at this level since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US — demonstrated the extent of concern which the Saudi leadership felt about the India-Israel strategic relations which had also blossomed since 2001.

The Saudi Crown Prince held talks with Gen. Musharraf and Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali, and Pakistani official sources said that the visit was as a result of an invitation delivered to the Crown Prince recently by Pres. Musharraf's special envoy. However, Saudi sources said that the visit was as much as a result of Saudi wishes as Pakistani. The visit also resulted in a complete harmony of expressed views on all common foreign policy issues — including whether Pakistan should, or should not, supply peacekeepers to Iraq [the consensus was to wait for an Iraqi invitation] — and a statement that Saudi economic aid to Pakistan would increase from \$65-million to \$100-million a year "as a token of its appreciation for Pakistan's impressive economic performance over the last four years".

Crown Prince 'Abdullah on October 19, 2003, visited an exhibition of defense equipment in Islamabad, and was accompanied by the Pakistani President and Prime Minister. The extensive display and demonstrations were not, according to Pakistani sources, just for show. There was a direct interest by Saudi Arabia in Pakistani-built systems.

Significantly, however, there were now routine cooperative exercises underway between RSAF and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) units in joint asset protection — air defense — deployments. These, too, were more than routine, and were, according to sources, aimed at developing joint capabilities to defend the proposed new strategic missile facilities in Saudi Arabia.

Saudi-Pakistani nuclear weapons planning and cooperation has been underway for some years, but it had always been felt that Pakistani officials were resisting pressure from Riyadh to provide actual weapons to Saudi Arabia. [Even now, the formula addresses Saudi needs, but keeps the weapons in Pakistani hands, at least nominally and for some purposes.] However, the trail of events makes it clear that Saudi Arabia had consistently worked toward the acquisition of a nuclear capability, provided by Pakistan.

It will be recalled that on May 6-7, 1999, then-Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif escorted Saudi Minister of Defense & Aviation Prince Sultan bin 'Abd al-Aziz al-Saud on a visit to Pakistani nuclear research facilities and the manufacturing facilities for the Ghauri liquid-fueled strategic ballistic missile (a derivative of the DPRK NoDong-1) in Kahuta. This was the first and only visit by a foreign dignitary to the facilities, and only the third by a Pakistani head-of-government. The host was Dr Abdul Qadir Khan, at that time regarded as the "father" of the Pakistani nuclear capability. Prince Sultan at this time was known to have engaged in what were described by sources as "very substantive" discussions with Pakistani officials for the acquisition of both nuclear weapons and Ghauri MRBMs. The Ghauri, with a range of only some 2,600km, was later to be bypassed, partly because of the range question; partly because it was liquid-fueled and not solid-fueled; and partly because of problems with the NoDong-1s being faced by its originator, the DPRK. Pakistani sources have said, however, that the Ghauri derivatives were likely to resume and were still viable.

Prince Sultan's visit to Pakistan was followed by a visit to Saudi Arabia in mid-September 2000 by a Pakistani strategic policy and nuclear delegation led by Dr Abdul Qadir Khan, Dr Ijaz Shafi Ghilani and Dr M. Younus But. They were guests of Prince Sultan, and at a speech on about September 20, 2000, Dr Abdul Qadir Khan thanked the Saudi Government for contributing to the success of the Pakistani nuclear weapons tests on May 28, 1998. That indicated a Saudi involvement in the Pakistani nuclear weapons program much earlier than Pakistani officials have generally acknowledged. [Saudi financial support for Pakistani nuclear research was, however, assumed even during the Zia ul-Haq era of the 1980s, but without any known understanding of a direct quid pro quo for Saudi Arabia.] On October 15, 2003, Pres. Musharraf met in Kuala Lumpur with Crown Prince 'Abdallah at the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The meeting was not reported, and was a one-on-one affair. That night, Pres. Musharraf met with a number of Pakistani officials and Pakistani expatriates, including a number of scientists who had come especially to Kuala Lumpur from China. One GIS source made notes of Pres. Musharraf's remarks, which were not reported, and which were deemed to be private.

The source, who made the notes available to GIS, noted that the President said that he was encouraged and optimistic and that Pakistan was about to spread its wings on the world stage. He said that the world was looking for a rôle for Pakistan, and that it could contribute something which nobody else could. He said that Pakistan was at a crossroads and that it could decide whether it would accept this challenge for the ummah (Islamic world) and Islam.

Pres. Musharraf said that the situation in South Asia was changing, as a result of which Pakistan would not be disconcerted by India's stockpiling of arms. Pakistan, he said, would no longer be cowed in this manner. By the grace of God, Pakistan was strong and getting stronger, Pres. Musharraf said, and would maintain its deterrence at all costs.

Meanwhile, the Government of Iran was itself maneuvering to continue its nuclear weapons development without a direct confrontation with the international community. On October 21, 2001, the clerical Government of Iran agreed with EU foreign ministers to suspend its disputed uranium enrichment program and sign an agreement allowing more comprehensive inspections of its nuclear sites by the United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). An unnamed Iranian official said: "We agreed to will suspend enrichment and sign the protocol" on tougher inspections. A European diplomat had earlier told Reuters news agency that Iran had agreed to halt uranium enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel.

Key Iranian opposition leader Dr Assad Homayoun, of the nationalist Azadegan Foundation, noted, in a report published in Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily on September 25, 2003: "I believe that if the clerical Government, even under political, economic and technical pressures, decided to sign the New Safeguards Measures of IAEA, it would not ratify it. There would be many ways and means to escape from the watching eyes of IAEA, and the clerical Government will never abandon its drive to acquire the atomic bomb."

The new Saudi-Pakistan accord on nuclear weapons deployment provides continued pressure, as far as the Iranian clerical leaders are concerned, to continue their own nuclear weapons program. Indeed, they have committed so much of the national capability toward acquisition of nuclear weapons that it was unlikely that they would stop at this point, particularly given the amount of maneuvering room which the IAEA normally would provide. So the

October 21, 2003, statement by Iran constituted the political maneuvering to which Dr Homayoun referred on September 25, 2003. IAEA head Mohamed al-Baradei also flew into Iran and said there on October 17, 2003, that Iranian officials had promised "full cooperation" with IAEA inspectors.

Iranian sources have said that the Iranian nuclear development programs — including the civil programs — were now scattered through so many sites around the country that it would be almost impossible for an IAEA inspection team to get to the most secret facilities in a short time.

The visit by Pakistan Prime Minister Zafarullah Jamali to Iran was ostensibly at the invitation of Iranian Pres. Seyed Mohammad Khatami. The Prime Minister was accompanied by Minister of Information and Broadcasting Sheikh Rashid Ahmed, Minister of Commerce Humayun Akhtar, Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources Nourez Shakoor and other senior officials, and was nominally to discuss the matter of natural gas imports from Iran. At present, three studies were being prepared on the proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan. India had shown reservations on laying of pipeline through Pakistan and has engaged companies for making feasibility reports on deep-sea, shallow waters and offshore pipeline.

Meanwhile, Pakistan on October 14, 2003, fired a medium-range nuclear missile Hatf IV capable of targeting India, its third and last in the current round of testing which began 11 days earlier. The testing of the surface-to-surface Hatf IV or Shaheen 1, which has a range of 700km, from an undisclosed location was the second in six days.

And on October 21, 2003, Pakistan and the People's Republic of China began a joint naval exercise "to further develop bilateral cooperation in the defense sector". It was also the PRC's first naval exercise with any foreign country. The exercise began near the Shanghai coast, involving frontline warships, maritime aircraft and helicopters from both sides, including two Pakistani warships.

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Times

October 23, 2003

Pg. 1

Bush Hails Joint Effort On N. Korea

By Joseph Curl, The Washington Times

BALI, Indonesia — President Bush said yesterday that a U.S.-Chinese alliance to deal with North Korea's nuclear threat and efforts by three other Asian countries are sending a strong message to the nation's dictator.

Mr. Bush, who this week offered security assurances to Pyongyang in return for a commitment to disarm, said China's role in the coalition has unified the region in applying pressure on North Korean leader Kim Jong-il.

"China is a major presence in the neighborhood," the president said in response to a question from The Washington Times aboard Air Force One en route to Australia. "The fact that they're willing to take the same message to the North Koreans that the United States is taking to the North Koreans, along with three other nations, is a powerful statement to Kim Jong-il that it's in his national interest that he abandon his nuclear-weapons ambition."

Mr. Bush began his day in Singapore, then flew to the Indonesian resort island of Bali amid heavy security that included U.S. warships and about 5,000 armed troops. There, he stood a few miles from the site of a deadly terrorist bombing last year and praised President Megawati Sukarnoputri.

"President Megawati has confronted this evil directly. She was one of the first leaders to stand with me after September 11th," he said.

Trying to counter anti-American lessons in many Indonesian schools, the Associated Press reported that the president said he would ask Congress for \$157 million in education grants for Mrs. Megawati's government. Like her American counterpart, Mrs. Megawati faces an election next year, and she has tried to appear close to Mr. Bush while balancing her citizens' suspicions of the United States.

"We do not always share common perspective," Mrs. Megawati said at a seaside news conference under a thatched-roof platform, according to the AP.

Mr. Bush also met with leading Muslim clerics, who criticized him for supporting Israel over Palestinians and for the war in Iraq. But the president said he explained his views.

"They said the United States' policy is tilted toward Israel, and I said our policy is tilted toward peace," he said.

At the tail end of a six-nation Asian-Australian tour, Mr. Bush said his meetings with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun have helped move the North Korean threat from a purely U.S. issue to a regional problem.

"Kim Jong-il is used to being able to deal bilaterally with the United States," Mr. Bush said in a conference room aboard his presidential jet. "But the change of policy now is, is that he must deal with other nations, most notably China."

"What's changed is, we've got five countries involved. And the neighborhood is now speaking. ... And now he's got his big neighbor to the — right on the border, he's got his neighbor to the south, he's got Japan, he's got another neighbor, Russia, all saying the same thing. It's a different dynamic," Mr. Bush said.

The president said his administration is willing to deal with North Korea as part of a multilateral effort to defuse the nuclear standoff that began last year, but will not enter into a formal nonaggression pact with the communist country.

"What we have now said is that in return for dismantling the programs, we're all willing to sign some kind of document — not a treaty — but a piece of paper that says, 'We won't attack you,'" Mr. Bush said. "North Korea must hear that in return for the dismantling of their program — in a verifiable way, by the way; I mean, we're going to want to know — that now five nations are willing to say something about his security."

The new U.S. strategy on North Korea follows a move to stifle those who have complained about American unilateralism in Iraq. The Bush administration earlier this year rejected urging by Capitol Hill Democrats to singlehandedly defuse tensions in the West African nation of Liberia, and more recently has rejected calls for more U.S. involvement in Iran. Iran is developing a civilian nuclear program that critics suspect is aimed at producing nuclear weapons.

Since the U.S.-led war in Iraq, there has been swift movement on the two other nations Mr. Bush had dubbed as being part of an "axis of evil." Although North Korea has dismissed the president's offer of written security guarantees as "laughable," the nation is coming under heavy pressure by neighbors. And Iran, which had refused any intervention or investigation of its nuclear program, has now acceded to demands that it permit nuclear inspectors access to all suspect facilities.

European leaders have taken a front role on Iran.

"Our European counterparts ... are influential, more so than we, in Iran," Mr. Bush said. "We've got a sanctions policy with Iran; they don't. And there's influence. This is an effective approach."

On Monday, Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment and allow inspectors unrestricted access.

The president then headed to Australia, where he addressed a joint session of Parliament in Canberra early today.

Mr. Hu, China's leader, will also speak to Australian lawmakers, in a speech tomorrow. For his part, Mr. Bush heads to Hawaii later today, then returns home tomorrow.

<http://www.washtimes.com/national/20031023-120617-71116r.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Times

October 23, 2003

Pg. 1

Israeli General Says Saudis Seek To Buy Pakistan Nukes

By David R. Sands, The Washington Times

A top Israeli intelligence official has charged that Saudi Arabia is pressing forward with a secret program to acquire nuclear-weapons technology from Pakistan, even as senior U.S. officials said yesterday they had seen "no information to substantiate" reports that a deal was in the works.

The Washington Times, citing a senior Pakistani source, reported yesterday that Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, the country's de facto ruler, concluded a long-rumored deal to obtain a nuclear deterrent in exchange for discounted Saudi oil during a visit to Islamabad over the weekend.

Such a deal would profoundly alter the balance of power in the Middle East, violate Saudi obligations under the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, and break promises made to Washington by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf about controlling his country's nuclear arsenal.

Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have strenuously denied the reports, with a Saudi Embassy spokesman dismissing the story yesterday as "not even worth a denial."

Talat Waseem, press counselor to the Pakistani Embassy, said in a letter to The Times there was "not a shred of truth" to the "wildly speculative story."

He denied the issue had been raised by President Bush or senior U.S. diplomats in their recent meetings with Pakistani leaders.

"While U.S.-Pakistan discussions cover a whole range of issues, including nonproliferation issues, nonproliferation is not an issue of current concern in our relations," Mr. Waseem wrote.

"Pakistan's commitment to nonproliferation of [weapons of mass destruction], including nuclear weapons, technology, materials, etc., is beyond question."

But Israeli radio and the New York Post reported yesterday that Maj. Gen. Aharon Zeevi, the Israel Defense Force's senior intelligence officer, told a parliamentary committee Tuesday that the Saudis had in fact gone to Islamabad with the intention of buying Pakistani warheads, to be placed on Saudi land-based missiles.

Gen. Zeevi said the Saudi drive for atomic weapons was motivated by the advanced nuclear program under way in Iran, its strategic and religious rival in the region. Saudi Arabia is predominantly Sunni Muslim while Iran has a Shi'ite Muslim majority.

Israeli officials have warned of an "Arab arms race" fueled by Iran's nuclear programs, which could have serious strategic consequences for the Jewish state.

U.S. officials played down the revelations yesterday, saying stories of a Pakistani-Saudi nuclear alliance were more than a decade old.

"We've seen the allegation, but we have not seen any information to substantiate what would seem to us to be rather bald assertions" of a nuclear pact, said State Department spokesman Adam Ereli.

"We are confident that Pakistan clearly understands our concerns regarding proliferation of nuclear technology. And we would also note that Saudi Arabia is a party to the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, under which it has agreed not to obtain nuclear weapons," he said.

A second U.S. government official with access to intelligence information discounted the Saudi-Pakistani nuclear link as well.

"There have been rumors along these lines for years," the official said, adding it is possible that the two governments have discussed nuclear cooperation.

"But we don't have information to suggest that there is an agreement to that effect," the official said.

But Mr. Ereli also said the administration has not yet confronted either country directly in light of the new revelations, saying U.S. officials regularly raise proliferation concerns in their frequent talks with Pakistani counterparts.

Analysts said Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have much to gain and much to lose from a nuclear cooperation pact. Past stories of a deal have been fueled by extensive ties between the two Muslim countries, in particular as Pakistan has tested and built its nuclear arsenal. Many suspect the oil-rich Saudis of helping finance Pakistan's purchases of nuclear technology from China and other sources.

The Saudi defense minister was given a rare tour of Pakistan's highly restricted Kahuta uranium-enrichment and missile factory in 1999.

In addition to fears of a nuclear Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have watched with growing unease the increasingly close military ties between Israel and India.

Saudi defense officials in England this summer discussed the outlines of a strategic policy paper being considered at the most senior levels in Riyadh.

Among the options put forward in the paper: developing or purchasing a nuclear deterrent; allying with an existing nuclear power such as Pakistan; or pursuing the diplomatic route by pressing for a regional nuclear-free pact.

Bangladeshi military analyst M. Abdul Hafiz, writing in the Bangladesh Daily Star this week, said intense regional instability is the driving factor.

"There's obviously a lot of restlessness in the Middle East today prompting and pushing the nations like Saudi Arabia to produce a nuclear deterrence," he wrote.

But David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector and president of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security, said he remained skeptical that an actual deal had been signed because of the immense repercussions for both countries.

"We know that senior Saudi officials are studying their options and sending signals, but to actually go through with this will bring down the wrath of the Americans on the Pakistanis and have huge negative implications for Saudi security as well," he said.

Bill Gertz contributed to this report.

<http://www.washtimes.com/world/20031022-113729-8359r.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Post

October 23, 2003

Pg. 18

Iran Still Has Nuclear Deadline, U.S. Says

By Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Bush administration intends to press Iran to comply with an Oct. 31 deadline for opening the books on its past nuclear activities, senior officials said yesterday, as U.S. skepticism grew toward this week's surprise agreement by Iran to stop enriching uranium.

Iran's ruling clerics hailed Tuesday's nuclear accord with France, Germany and Britain. But U.S. and U.N. officials awaited the handover of new documents from Iran spelling out how and why the oil-rich nation built a number of sophisticated nuclear factories and laboratories in a rugged area south and west of Tehran.

The documents, which Iran promised to deliver to U.N. officials late yesterday, were considered a critical test for Iran, which until now has resisted demands to fully open its nuclear program to international inspection. The Bush administration contends that Iran is secretly attempting to develop nuclear weapons.

"The pressure is still on Iran," said a senior U.S. nonproliferation official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

"Nothing changes the fact that Iran still must fully comply and explain itself by October 31st," the deadline set by the U.N.-affiliated International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for turning over nuclear data.

With Tuesday's accord, Iran appeared to be seeking to avert a showdown over its nuclear program while avoiding the appearance of bending to U.S. pressure. Iran pledged to temporarily halt enriching uranium and several other activities potentially useful in developing nuclear weapons. It also agreed to submit to more intrusive inspections of its nuclear facilities by IAEA officials.

Official White House reaction to the agreement has been positive, if guarded. President Bush, speaking to reporters yesterday aboard Air Force One en route to Australia, described the European initiative as "an effective approach."

But privately, administration officials have expressed skepticism, noting that the accord does not specify how long Iran's must suspend its uranium enrichment. On Tuesday, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Hassan Rouhani, said that "it could last for one day or one year; it depends on us."

Some U.S. and European diplomats questioned whether Iran's intent was to isolate the United States diplomatically while buying more time to pursue weapons surreptitiously. "It may well be a clever device, a way to divide Europe and America while giving the Iranians a public relations coup," said one Western diplomat familiar with the negotiations.

In Tehran, President Mohammad Khatami said the agreement demonstrated to the world "that we are sincere."

Senior officials of his government promised to quickly deliver to the IAEA a full accounting of Iranian nuclear activity since the 1970s.

Diplomats and weapons experts said the depth of Iran's sincerity will become apparent over the coming days. They said Iran now faces more pressure to clear up serious questions, including the source of the traces of weapons-grade uranium found in two nuclear facilities this summer. Iranian officials deny having enriched uranium in Iran before June of this year.

"Iran now has to perform," said David Albright, a former IAEA inspector and president of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security. "Iran's declarations about its past activities will be the first benchmark of its performance."

Rose Gottemoeller, a top nonproliferation official at the Energy Department during the Clinton administration, said Iran had taken a positive step by "making it clear they're not going to be another pariah state -- another North Korea."

"Are they also trying to buy time? Probably yes," Gottemoeller said. "But in a way this buys time for all of us. It gives us a chance to leverage those interests in Iran that say, 'We don't want to be another Pyongyang.'"

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2870-2003Oct22.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times

October 23, 2003

The Mullahs And The Bomb

By Gary Milhollin

WASHINGTON — With much fanfare, and the reluctant endorsement of the Bush administration, Iran has vowed to suspend its controversial effort to produce enriched uranium — which can be used as fuel in nuclear weapons — and to clear up a host of suspicions about its nuclear program. In exchange, the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany promised new "cooperation" — meaning trade — in high technology with Tehran. While perhaps getting any concessions out of the mullahs should be seen as a step forward, this particular deal won't prevent Iran from making the bomb. It also risks having the same outcome as the deal North Korea made in 1994 and later violated, and threatens to drive a wedge between the United States and its European allies on Iran policy.

The suspicions about Iran's nuclear aims are well founded. Leaving aside the question whether such an oil-rich country even needs nuclear power plants, America has long questioned why Iran is building a factory to enrich uranium, material for which there is no reasonable need in Iran's civilian power program.

Iran also plans to produce plutonium, another fuel for nuclear weapons, by building a 40-megawatt heavy water reactor at Arak. This type of reactor, too small for electricity and larger than needed for research, is now providing the fuel for atomic weapons programs in India, Israel and Pakistan. And Iran is developing a fleet of long-range missiles, which don't make sense as a way to deliver conventional warheads. The only logical purpose of such missiles is to carry nuclear ones.

International suspicions about these programs led to the current crisis: the International Atomic Energy Agency has given Iran until Oct. 31 to explain how mysterious traces of bomb-grade uranium got into two Iranian nuclear sites. Iran says the traces arrived on contaminated imports; the other explanation is that Iran has been secretly enriching uranium in violation of its inspection agreement with the agency. The agency also wants to know how Iran developed such a high level of enrichment technology without secretly testing it with nuclear material, which is also forbidden. The agency's experts are convinced that the testing occurred.

Under the new deal, Iran is supposed to explain all this. If it doesn't, it risks being condemned as a pariah by the Security Council and the European Union may have to shelve its trade agreement with Iran, which would cost all concerned a lot of money. Thus Britain, France and Germany, as well as Iran, have an interest in seeing Iran comply. But the problem is, even if Iran does so, there will be little assurance that the deal will really dampen Iran's nuclear hopes. Consider what happened with the pact hammered out by the Clinton administration with North Korea in 1994, which had much in common with the present situation.

North Korea faced worldwide condemnation and a possible war with the United States after violating its inspection agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. By agreeing to suspend its effort to produce plutonium, North Korea avoided censure and got economic benefits from the West, and yet it preserved its nuclear potential intact. North Korea's 8,000 fuel rods — containing five bombs' worth of plutonium — never left the country. Like a sword poised over the world's head, they remained only months away from being converted into bomb fuel — something that the North Koreans say was finally done this summer. The North Korean bomb program only shifted into neutral; now it is back in gear.

Under Tuesday's deal Iran, too, will shift into neutral, while keeping its nuclear potential intact. It won't — for the time being — operate its newly constructed centrifuges, which are needed to enrich uranium to weapon grade. But the deal won't stop Iran from building more centrifuges to augment the limited number it now has, thus adding to its future ability to enrich uranium. Nor does the agreement bar Iran from completing the factory that produces the uranium gas that goes into the centrifuges. Nor does it prevent the building of the heavy water reactor or, indeed, the resumption of enrichment in the future. Thus the agreement could insulate Iran from international censure without hampering its nuclear progress in any way.

These defects won't be cured by Iran's acceptance of more rigorous inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The inspectors' new rights are still weaker than those that were enjoyed by their counterparts in Iraq — and we all know that the Iraqis repeatedly foiled those efforts with delays and obfuscation.

The only real solution is to convince Iran to dismantle all the plants that can make fuel for nuclear weapons. This would remove the threat that Iran could go back into the bomb business on a moment's notice, and the country could still benefit from the electricity generated by its Russian-supplied reactor at Bushehr, which should be sufficient if Iran truly wants only civilian nuclear power.

This goal is what the Europeans hope to achieve in the long run. It would probably satisfy the United States as well. But the current agreement won't take us there, and it may lead to the same sort of bickering between the United States and its vital allies that fractured international action on North Korea and Iraq.

The only chance for a solution to the Iran nuclear problem, short of war, is for a united West to apply relentless economic pressure. That means quickly closing any gap between Europe and the United States. It may be possible to convince Iran that the costs of building nuclear weapons exceed the benefit of having them. Unlike North Korea, Iran has large trade interests that really matter. However, unless the rest of the world is willing to put those interests at risk, it will probably soon have to live with a new nuclear power in the Middle East.

Gary Milhollin is director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/23/opinion/23MILH.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Newsweek (International Edition)

October 27, 2003

How North Korea Got The Bomb

After 50 years of research, and much outside scientific help, Pyongyang may be close to detonating a nuke

By George Wehrfritz and Richard Wolffe

Few North Koreans have suffered more directly for Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions than Kimchaek University's class of '62. Shortly before graduation day, the campus began buzzing with news that atomic scientists were needed for a new research lab being built for the "Great Leader," Kim Il Sung. "Our professors really pushed the need for nuclear development," recalls one class member who escaped the country two years ago and recently told NEWSWEEK his story. "The rumor circulating among students was that those of us sent there wouldn't have long to live."

The defector can't be sure how many of his friends died young. He was lucky enough to be assigned elsewhere after college. As years passed, though, he kept running into former classmates who were wasting away from radiation sickness. "It was exactly what we feared," the defector says. "Many of them lost their eyebrows. Some of them had constant nosebleeds. They looked so weak it was hard to even face them." He blames the government's disregard for human lives: "The thinking was, 'If one scientist falls, there will always be others to take his place.'" That merciless logic ravaged not only a generation of North Korean physicists but the entire country, consuming billions of dollars that might otherwise have built a functioning economy capable of feeding its citizens. The program itself, however, succeeded: by most accounts, Kim's son and successor, "Dear Leader" Kim Jong Il, is only a button's click away from detonating a nuclear weapon.

Kim's bomb is one of the most urgent problems facing the Bush administration—and Pyongyang clearly likes the notoriety. "There has been debate recently in the international community on whether [North Korea] has a nuclear deterrent," the regime warned last week, just before President George W. Bush set off on his six-day trip to Asia. "When the time comes, we will take action to physically display [our] nuclear deterrent. At that point, such a debate will no longer be necessary." But the threat goes far beyond North Korea's crude efforts to extort aid and concessions from its neighbors and the Americans. The success of Kim's nuclear program is proof that even the most abject poverty, backwardness and isolation cannot stop a truly determined regime from building a bomb. "If they squeeze their economy hard enough," says Daniel Pinkston, a proliferation specialist at the Monterey Institute for International Studies, "any country with a population of 20 to 25 million will have the core group of people who can do it."

How did Pyongyang get the bomb? In reply to that question, a senior South Korean military official pulls a cell phone from his shirt pocket. "This is a metaphor for North Korea's program," he says. "A few parts from here, a battery from there, and it could work even if the antenna malfunctions." Starting in the 1950s, the North's scientists are said to have gleaned vital components, raw material and information from more than a dozen countries on four continents. They even managed to swipe useful data from the files of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. And yet hardly anyone in the world was ever willing to trust the regime with nuclear weapons—not even the Great Leader's best friends in Moscow and Beijing.

All the same, Western intelligence experts are convinced that Pyongyang is not bluffing. On Oct. 3, the regime announced that it had finished turning its stock of 8,017 uranium fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium, enough to build as many as six bombs. There's no doubt that the North has been extracting bomb fuel. In June, strategically placed sensors began detecting traces of the telltale isotope krypton-85, a byproduct of the extraction process, in North Korea's air. The only question is whether the job is done: national-security experts in Seoul believe that Pyongyang has used special "carbon bed" filters to cut its krypton emissions—and hence keep the West guessing about how much fissile material it has.

All that's left to do is assemble the pieces. And perhaps to load them aboard a ballistic missile or a less conventional delivery system, like a shipping container or minisub. Maybe even sell one to terrorists, if the price is right. "North Korea has the capability of producing three to five basic-level nuclear bombs at this moment," says Kim Tae Hyo of the South Korean government's Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. "They already have a transportation mechanism to carry those bombs over to Honolulu and Alaska." That would be the Taepodong I missile, with a 2,500-kilometer range.

There are hints that the regime might actually be understating its capabilities. The North reportedly conducted high-intensity explosive tests in the late 1990s—the meticulously calibrated kind of detonations that are required to set off an atomic bomb. "These are the tests you would need to conduct to know that you had a working system," says one Western diplomat in Seoul. Even before the Northerners began reprocessing their spent fuel rods about six months ago, they were believed to have the makings of at least one bomb. "The considered judgment was that they certainly extracted enough material for one or two and probably three or four weapons," the diplomat says. "If you straight-line out the developments over a period of time, by now they should have been able to develop basic working nuclear devices." It sounds plausible when you consider the pace of other developing nations' nuclear programs—as in Pakistan, which appears to have shared nuclear expertise with North Korea.

The origins of Pyongyang's nuclear program are a study in unintended consequences. The first push came not from China or the Soviet Union but from the Japanese Empire. Back when the peninsula was a colonial possession, many of its brightest young scientists studied in Japan. They would become the core of North Korea's scientific elite in the 1950s, when basic nuclear research started. The late scientist and inventor Lee Sung Ki, called the "first father" of North Korea's nuclear program, earned a degree in chemical engineering at Kyoto Imperial University.

After World War II, Japan left behind uranium mining and milling operations in the mountains of northern Korea—the remains of its own secret nuclear program. The Koreans quickly put that equipment to use, exporting uranium to the Soviet Union. "In a way, it was the export of uranium that financed the military buildup that allowed the North to invade the South in 1950," says former Russian diplomat Alexandre Y. Mansourov, a North Korea specialist at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii. "That's how North Korea paid for the weapons and grain they got [leading up to the Korean War]."

America inadvertently gave Pyongyang the next boost. In Seoul, the fledgling government of Syngman Rhee undertook a U.S.-designed plan to reorganize the South's education system. Opponents denounced the move as a ploy to get rid of leftist professors, and they warned it would only weaken the country's already feeble science curriculum. Yet the plan went ahead, and Seoul National University alone lost 38 scientists and engineers—among them the eventual brains of North Korea's nuclear-power program.

The best jobs most of those professors could find were miserable instructorships at small vocational schools. Pyongyang sent recruiters to talk to them. The pitch wasn't at all ideological, says Kim Geun Bae, an intellectual historian at Chonbuk University in Chonju. Instead, the recruiters promised only that the North would fund the sciences. "By the time the Korean War ended," Kim says, "about 80 scientists, or roughly 40 percent of all science graduates in the South, had defected to the North."

As long as they avoided trouble with the North's totalitarian government, the professors had a world of new scientific opportunities. In 1956, Moscow invited them to the newly established United Institute of Nuclear Research in Dubna. In all, some 250 scientists from the North worked and studied there, according to former *Izvestiya* journalist Aleksandr Zhebin. Later, back in North Korea, a team of Soviet experts helped the cadre of Korean scientists build an experimental 2-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon that went online in 1965 and jump-started North Korea's nuclear research.

The Russians called it Object 9559 (the Soviets' code number on all technical-aid contracts with Pyongyang). The Koreans called it the Furniture Factory—and over time Yongbyon became the heart of a sprawling nuclear industry linking uranium mines with processing mills, fuel-fabrication facilities and a reprocessing plant capable of extracting weapons-grade plutonium from spent fuel rods. Much of the machinery seems to have been re-engineered by Korean scientists working from Soviet prototypes. "It's very difficult to draw a dividing line between the peaceful and nonpeaceful use of atomic energy," Yuri Federov, deputy director of the Moscow-based Institute for Applied International Research told *NEWSWEEK*. "But basically the knowledge and expertise in the nuclear field was provided by the Soviets."

Moscow still refused to give Pyongyang a turnkey nuclear program—what's needed to design a plant from scratch—let alone the specific expertise needed to build a bomb. In fact, geopolitics began pushing the two communist countries apart in the 1970s. After India's undeclared nuclear test in 1974, the United States and Soviet Union co-sponsored a global nonproliferation treaty. Kim Il Sung's brutal purge of pro-Moscow factions from the Korean Workers' Party put a further strain on relations. North Korea stopped inviting Soviet scientists to participate in its nuclear projects, preferring to acquire expertise on its own through its philosophy of *juche* (self-reliance). The North twice expanded the capacity of the Yongbyon reactor in the 1970s. In the 1980s North Korea added a 5-megawatt graphite reactor—in effect, a bomb-fuel factory—based on an old British model. In 1987 Kim Il Sung called for the "fast pursuit of nuclear energy," describing the industry as "futuristic and communist."

The North's program owes much to the work of several North Korean diplomats, including Choi Hak Geun. Posted to IAEA's Vienna headquarters from 1974 to 1978, he scoured the agency's library and other open-source material for nuclear know-how. South Korea didn't discover his activities until the early 1980s. "I was shocked to see what the IAEA gave the North," a senior South Korean scientist told *NEWSWEEK*. "But then again, it was a time when the agency's primary goal was to spread nuclear technology and not to regulate it."

Pyongyang's most serious push for the bomb began roughly a decade ago—not long after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The aid shipments and the lavish trade subsidies from the Soviet Union and its satellites had stopped flowing. Old security guarantees were gone, too, so North Korea launched new initiatives to bolster its own capabilities. One of these focused on ballistic missiles—both for defense and export—while another radically expanded production of chemical and biological weapons.

Pyongyang had by then shifted its attention from building power plants to developing the bomb. Besides developing plutonium weapons that relied on nuclear power plants for fuel, Korean scientists also sought to build weapons using highly enriched uranium. The latter required reprocessing technologies that breached the nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which the North had signed in 1985. As the regime's intentions became increasingly hard to ignore, Russia and China distanced themselves even further from their former comrades in Pyongyang. Instead, the North found a new partner—Pakistan. Indian intelligence sources say contacts between the two countries began after Benazir Bhutto became prime minister in 1988. None other than the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, reached out to Pyongyang in 1993, according to a Western diplomatic source in Islamabad. The Pakistani physicist needed a delivery system for the arsenal he was creating, and the North Koreans had just what he was looking for. Kim Jong Il, who took command of the North after his father's death, agreed to sell Khan the plans and parts to build a Pakistani version of the Taepodong nuclear-capable ballistic missile. In return, says the diplomat, North Korea asked for Pakistan's centrifuge technology for enriching uranium. Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, has vehemently denied any such deals. "I guarantee 400 percent that nothing has taken place between us and North Korea," he said in January. "No transfer of nuclear technology has taken place in the past and [it] will not happen in the future."

Khan refuses to talk about any aspect of Pakistan's nuclear program, but he has reportedly made 13 trips to North Korea since his first visit. In addition to supplying plans for Pakistani-style centrifuges (hundreds of—which are needed to extract enough fissile material for a single nuclear device), he is said to have provided the North Koreans with invaluable information on how to buy parts for specialized nuclear equipment. "You can search the world, spending lots of money, and still be unsuccessful," says Pakistani physicist Pervez Hoodbhoy. "So someone who has been actively engaged in buying the necessary electronics, hardware, computer codes, switches and magnets is worth his weight in gold."

The alleged exchanges continued in defiance of the 1994 Agreed Framework signed by Pyongyang and the Clinton administration. That accord stipulated that in exchange for the North's promise to end its nuclear-weapons program, the Americans would help Pyongyang build two 1,000-megawatt reactors and provide North Korea with 500,000 tons of fuel oil annually until 2003, when the reactors were supposed to be finished. The pact crumbled in late 2002 after U.S. intelligence discovered the North's secret enrichment program. Bush administration officials say Pyongyang got caught buying centrifuge secrets from Pakistan and spun-aluminum tubes from Russia. Confronted with the charge, Pyongyang expelled U.N. nuclear inspectors, withdrew from the NPT and announced plans to begin turning fuel rods into bombs.

North Korea probably began cheating on the 1994 deal before the ink was dry. Scores of high-explosive tests done in the late 1990s suggest ongoing work to perfect a nuclear detonator. A female scientist who claims to have been in Yongbyon in the 1990s describes schemes concocted to hide covert weapons research. In a transcript allegedly made after she fled into China last year (and obtained by NEWSWEEK through a humanitarian group that arranged her exile in South Korea), she describes deception at the No. 304 Research Institute where she worked, a facility "involved with making both nuclear and chemical weapons." To dodge IAEA inspections, she says, "we moved all materials and equipment into underground caves." Eventually, a new plant called the August Facility was constructed. "The place is hidden inside a forest and connected with a new railroad from other facilities," she added. "It processed uranium for use in other institutes."

Despite the mounting evidence of bomb-making capabilities, the West keeps hoping Pyongyang will change its ways. Diplomatic observers predict that the North will agree to a new round of talks with Russia, China, Japan, the United States and South Korea, perhaps as early as next month. Pyongyang's nuclear threats can only go so far. The Dear Leader may test his "deterrent," but if he were ever foolish enough to actually use it, he'd lose everything—his power, his perks, his country, his life. Surely he doesn't want to end up like Kimchaek University's class of '62.

With Hideko Takayama in Tokyo, B. J. Lee in Seoul, Ron Moreau and Sudip Mazumdar in New Delhi, Zahid Hussain in Islamabad and Stefanie Mcintyre in Moscow

<http://www.msnbc.com/news/982249.asp>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

(Editor's Note: Following this article is a press release dated 11 August 2003, "Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet on the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction.")

Washington Post

October 24, 2003

Pg. 1

Inquiry Faults Intelligence On Iraq

Threat From Saddam Hussein Was Overstated, Senate Committee Report Finds

By Dana Priest, Washington Post Staff Writer

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is preparing a blistering report on prewar intelligence on Iraq that is critical of CIA Director George J. Tenet and other intelligence officials for overstating the weapons and terrorism case against Saddam Hussein, according to congressional officials.

The committee staff was surprised by the amount of circumstantial evidence and single-source or disputed information used to write key intelligence documents -- in particular the Oct. 2002 National Intelligence Estimate -- summarizing Iraq's capabilities and intentions, according to Republican and Democratic sources. Staff members interviewed more than 100 people who collected and analyzed the intelligence used to back up statements about Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons capabilities, and its possible links to terrorist groups.

Like a similar but less exhaustive inquiry being completed by the House intelligence committee, the Senate report shifts attention toward the intelligence community and away from White House officials, who have been criticized for exaggerating the Iraqi threat. At stake as the presidential political season approaches, said committee sources and intelligence figures, is who gets blamed for misleading the American public if weapons of mass destruction are never found in Iraq -- the president or his intelligence chief.

Asked about the upcoming report, Sen. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.), chairman of the committee, said "the executive was ill-served by the intelligence community." The intelligence was sometimes "sloppy" and inconclusive, he said. "That's a concern I have with the total report" on Iraq.

"I worry about the credibility of the intelligence community," said Roberts, who added that he is concerned about demoralizing the intelligence agencies when intensive counterterrorism operations are going on overseas. Still, he insisted, "If there's stuff on the fan, we have to get the fan cleaned."

Despite the progress it has made since June in poring over 19 volumes of classified material, the committee is deeply divided over investigating how the Bush administration used intelligence in its public statements about Iraq. Sen. John "Jay" Rockefeller (D-W. Va.) said yesterday he had secured a promise from Roberts to ask one executive agency, the Defense Department and, in particular, its Office of Special Plans, for information about the intelligence it collected or analyzed on Iraq.

The office has been accused by some congressional Democrats and administration critics of gathering unreliable intelligence on Iraq that bolstered the administration's case for war. Those allegations have not been substantiated, and the director of the office, William Luti, has denied them.

Rockefeller is under considerable pressure from the Senate Democratic leadership not to allow Roberts to focus only on intelligence bureaucrats while avoiding questions about whether Bush, Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and others exaggerated the threat from Iraq.

But it is unclear whether the committee has jurisdiction on this topic. Also, the administration could cite executive privilege and refuse to give the committee information related to internal White House discussions, as it did when a congressional inquiry tried to find out what Bush had been told about al Qaeda and the possibility of civilian aircraft used as weapons before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

"We're going to get this one way or the other," Rockefeller said yesterday. "If the majority declines to put the executive branch at risk, then they are going to have a very difficult minority to deal with."

He said that if that turned out to be the case, he has the five votes necessary, under Rule 6 of the committee's rules of procedure, to launch an inquiry into the administration's use of intelligence.

The House and Senate intelligence committees have traditionally worked in a more bipartisan fashion than other congressional committees.

CIA spokesman Bill Harlow defended the intelligence community's performance. "The NIE reflects 10 years of work regarding Iraq's WMD [weapons of mass destruction] programs. It is based on many sources and disciplines, both ours and those of partners around the world," he said.

Harlow said that "the committee has yet to take the opportunity to hear a comprehensive explanation of how and why we reached our conclusions," nor has it accepted an offer made Wednesday by Tenet to hear from him and senior intelligence officials.

The Senate panel's report, congressional sources said, will be harsher and better substantiated than the inquiry near completion by the House counterpart. Last month, leaders of the House panel sent Tenet a letter criticizing him for having relied too heavily on "past assessments" dating to 1998 and on "some new 'piecemeal' intelligence," both of which "were not challenged as a routine matter."

Tenet shot back an angry letter criticizing the committee for not interviewing enough people.

Among the more than 100 people interviewed by the Senate are analysts, scientists, operators and supervisory officials from the CIA, the departments of Energy and State, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, as well as officials at the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Roberts said none of those questioned have said they were pressured to change their work to fit the administration's point of view. Other committee members pointed out, however, that some analysts may not have felt free to speak candidly because there were supervisors in the room during their interviews.

Several sources said the committee report is also critical "of the substantiation the intelligence community gave the administration" on many of its assessments of weapons of mass destruction. They said caveats by agencies other than the CIA often were played down.

The committee also has not found underlying intelligence that would support some changes in the intelligence community's public conclusions about Iraq in the months leading up to the war. For example, the declassified version of the October 2002 NIE declares in the first paragraph that "Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons"

In all other documents, the intelligence community used more qualified language.

A CIA spokesman said the statement, like the entire NIE, was written under extreme time pressure, and that the information was qualified in supporting material later in the report.

The committee is also looking at why some exculpatory information contained in the raw intelligence reports "seems to not have filtered up" to finished intelligence reports.

Roberts described the report as "95 percent done." But others on the committee, including Rockefeller, want to broaden the inquiry. They insist the report is in the preliminary stage and will not be finished until the end of the year, or later.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A9230-2003Oct23.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

11 August 2003

Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet on the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction

A great deal has been said and written about the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction. Much of this commentary has been misinformed, misleading, and just plain wrong. It is important to set the record straight. Let me make three points.

- We stand by the judgments in the NIE.
- The NIE demonstrates consistency in our judgments over many years and are based on a decade's worth of work. Intelligence is an iterative process and as new evidence becomes available we constantly reevaluate.
- We encourage dissent and reflect it in alternative views.

We stand behind the judgments of the NIE as well as our analyses on Iraq's programs over the past decade. Those outside the process over the past ten years and many of those commenting today do not know, or are misrepresenting, the facts. We have a solid, well-analyzed and carefully written account in the NIE and the numerous products before it.

After David Kay and others finish their efforts—after we have exploited all the documents, people and sites in Iraq—we should and will stand back to professionally review where we are—but not before.

The history of our judgments on Iraq's weapons programs is clear and consistent. On biological weapons and missiles our data got stronger in recent years. We have had a solid historical foundation and new data that have allowed us to make judgments and attribute high confidence in specific areas. And we had numerous credible sources, including many who provided information after 1998. When inspectors were pushed out in 1998, we did not sit back. Rather, we significantly increased our collection efforts throughout the Intelligence Community. In other words, despite what many read in the media that the NIE is based on nothing—no sources, no understanding of complicated procurement networks, etc.—the fact is we made significant professional progress.

The National Intelligence Estimate remains the Intelligence Community's most authoritative product. The process by which we produce NIEs—including the one on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction—has been honed over nearly 30 years. It is a process that is designed to provide policymakers in both the executive and the legislative branches with our best judgments on the most crucial national security issues. This process is designed to produce coordinated judgments—but not to the exclusion of differing views or without exposing uncertainties. During coordination, agencies send representatives who are actively engaged and change NIE drafts to reflect better the views of the experts in their respective agencies. It is an open and vigorous process that allows for dissent to be registered by individual agencies in the final product. Indeed, alternative views are encouraged. Finally, the NIE is reviewed by the directors of US intelligence agencies composing the DCI-chaired National Foreign Intelligence Board, including in this case, CIA, DIA, INR, NSA, DoE, and NIMA. This rigorous NIE process has served this nation well.

Building upon ten years of analysis, intelligence reporting, and inspections that had to fight through Iraq's aggressive denial and deception efforts, including phony and incomplete data declarations to the UN and programs explicitly designed with built-in cover stories, the Intelligence Community prepared the NIE on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. In it we judged that the entire body of information over that ten years made clear that Saddam had never abandoned his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

Nuclear program. Shortly after the Gulf war of 1990-91 the International Atomic Energy Agency and the US Intelligence Community were surprised at how much more advanced Iraq's program was prior to the war than had been judged previously. In fact, the IAEA's 1996 report indicated that Iraq could have completed its first nuclear device by as early as late 1992 had the program not been derailed by the Gulf war. Intelligence analysts reevaluated Iraq's nuclear program in 1994 and 1997 in light of the body of inspection revelations and seized documents and concluded that Iraq could have a nuclear weapon within a year of obtaining sufficient material and, if *unconstrained*, would take five to seven years with foreign assistance to produce enough fissile material. Those judgments, to which all agencies agreed, have remained consistent for years.

The NIE points out that by 2002, all agencies assessed that Saddam did not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient fissile material to make any, but never abandoned his nuclear weapons ambitions. Moreover, most agencies believed that Iraq's attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifuge rotors, magnets, high-speed balancing machines, and machine tools, as well as Iraq's efforts to enhance its cadre of weapons personnel and activities at several suspect nuclear sites indicated that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. Saddam's personal interest in some of these efforts was also considered. DOE agreed that reconstitution was underway, but assessed that the tubes probably were not part of the program. INR assessed that Baghdad was pursuing at least a limited effort to acquire nuclear weapon-related capabilities, but not an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons; INR was not persuaded that the tubes were intended for the nuclear program. All other agencies, including DOE, assessed that Iraq probably would not have a weapon until 2007 to 2009, consistent with the decade-old judgment of Iraq needing five to seven years to develop a weapons-grade uranium enrichment capability if freed from constraints. These judgments and the six elements upon which the reconstitution judgment was based were agreed to by those agencies during coordination of the NIE and at the meeting of the heads of all the intelligence agencies before publication.

- We note yet again that uranium acquisition was not part of this judgment. Despite all the focus in the media, it was *not* one of the six elements upon which the judgment was based. Why not? Because Iraq already had significant quantities of uranium.
- Also it is noteworthy that although DOE assessed that the tubes probably were not part of Iraq's nuclear program, DOE *agreed* that reconstitution was underway. Obviously, the tubes were not central to DOE's view on reconstitution.

Even though the tubes constituted only one of the six elements underpinning the other agencies' judgment on reconstitution, I will discuss it briefly. We need to point out that DOE is not the only agency that has experts on the issue. CIA has centrifuge and rocket experts. The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)—the US military's center for analysis of foreign conventional weaponry—has battlefield rocket experts. These experts, along with those from DOE, were involved in the NIE process and their views were recorded. All agencies agreed that the tubes *could be used* to build gas centrifuges for a uranium enrichment program, so we are talking about differences in agency views about *intent*.

- CIA, DIA, and NSA believed the tubes were intended for that purpose.
- DOE believed they probably were not part of the nuclear program and that conventional military uses were more plausible
- INR was not persuaded that the tubes were intended for use as centrifuge rotors and considered artillery rockets as the most likely purpose.
- NGIC believed that these tubes were poor choices for rocket motor bodies.

Not surprisingly, the Iraqis went to great lengths to mask their intentions across the board, including in their efforts to acquire tubes with increasingly higher sets of specifications. Thus, the fact that we had alternative views on the issue would be expected. But the NIE went to great lengths to spell out those views. Many reading these alternative views, however, almost certainly recalled how far Iraq had come in the early 1990s toward a nuclear weapon without our knowledge, making all the factors leading us to the reconstitution judgment more important.

Biological Weapons. All agencies of the Intelligence Community since 1995 have judged that Iraq retained biological weapons and that the BW program continued. In 1999 we assessed Iraq had revitalized its program. New intelligence acquired in 2000 provided compelling information about Iraq's ongoing offensive BW activities, describing construction of mobile BW agent production plants—reportedly designed to evade detection—with the potential to turn out several hundred tons of unconcentrated BW agent per year. Thus, it was not a new story in 2002 when all agencies judged in the NIE that Iraq had biological weapons—that it had some lethal and

incapacitating BW agents—and was capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax. We judged that most of the key aspects of Iraq's offensive BW program were more advanced than before the Gulf war.

Chemical Weapons. As early as 1994, all agencies assessed that Iraq could begin limited production of chemical agents almost immediately after UN sanctions, inspections and monitoring efforts were ended. By 1997, the Intelligence Community judged that Iraq was protecting a breakout capability to produce more weapons and agent quickly. We further assessed in 1997, that within months Iraq could restart full-scale production of sarin and that pre-Desert Storm agent production levels—including production of VX—could be achieved in two to three years. And so it was not a surprising story when all agencies judged in the NIE in 2002 that Baghdad possessed chemical weapons, had begun renewed production of mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX and probably had at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents, much of it added in the last year.

Delivery Systems. The Intelligence Community's assessment on the possibility of Iraq having a few covert Scuds has been consistent since at least 1995. As Iraq continued to develop its short-range missiles, we collected more data and by 1999 were able to begin determining that both missiles were capable of flying over 150 km. Also by 1999 we had noted that according to multiple sources, Iraq was conducting a high-priority program to convert jet trainer aircraft to lethal UAVs, likely intended for delivering biological agents. Again, not a new story for the NIE to judge that Iraq maintained a small missile force and several development programs, including an UAV that could deliver a biological warfare agent.

In sum, the NIE on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was the product of years of reporting and intelligence collection, analyzed by numerous experts in several different agencies. Our judgments have been consistent on this subject because the evidence has repeatedly pointed to continued Iraqi pursuit of WMD and efforts to conceal that pursuit from international scrutiny. Modifications of our judgments have reflected new evidence, much of which was acquired because of our intensified collection efforts. Thus, noting that Saddam had continued to pursue weapons of mass destruction was not startling. That he probably was hiding weapons was not new. That he would seek means to improve his capabilities using alternative-use cover stories would have been expected. That we would have alternative views is respected as part of the process. We stand by the soundness and integrity of our process, and no one outside the Intelligence Community told us what to say or not to say in this Estimate. As with any other topic addressed in an NIE, the acquisition of further evidence may confirm some of our judgments while calling others into question. Operation Iraqi Freedom obviously has opened a major new opportunity for learning about the WMD activities of Saddam Husayn's regime. We have no doubt, however, that the NIE was the most reasonable, well-grounded, and objective assessment of Iraq's WMD programs that was possible at the time it was produced.

http://www.odci.gov/cia/public_affairs/press_release/2003/pr08112003.htm

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Los Angeles Times
October 24, 2003

Iran Discloses Nuclear Activities

Tehran hands over data to the U.N. as required by a resolution last month. A potentially significant gap in the information is noted.

By Douglas Frantz, Times Staff Writer

VIENNA — Iran turned over a dossier on its nuclear activities to the United Nations on Thursday, hoping to persuade the international community that it is not trying to build an atomic bomb.

The handover was intended to meet one of Iran's obligations under a resolution imposed last month by the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency that gives Tehran until Oct. 31 to come clean on its nuclear activities.

Mohamed ElBaradei, the director-general of the IAEA, said he was assured that the report provided by Iran was comprehensive and accurate. He said it would take several weeks to verify the information.

But U.N. officials immediately confronted a potentially significant gap in the material.

Ali Akbar Salehi, the Iranian representative to the IAEA, said the records did not contain information about where Iran acquired components for centrifuges used to enrich uranium, a process that can provide fuel for a reactor or material for a nuclear weapon.

Salehi told reporters that the information was not contained in the Iranian records because the components had been purchased "through intermediaries" on the black market.

IAEA officials consider understanding the origins of the centrifuge equipment vital to determining whether Iran tried to enrich uranium to a weapons-grade level.

Traces of highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium were found by the IAEA on centrifuges at a plant under construction outside Natanz in central Iran and at Kalaye Electric Co., a formerly secret nuclear facility near Tehran where Iran tested centrifuges.

The United States and others pointed to the discovery of the minute amounts of substance as strong evidence that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. Tehran contended that the centrifuge components were already contaminated when they were purchased abroad.

IAEA officials and outside experts were skeptical of the explanation, and the U.N. agency had specifically asked Iran to provide information about the origin of the centrifuges.

"We should know the origin of materials and equipment to verify the Iranian statement that this [weapons-grade uranium] was the result of contamination," ElBaradei said at a joint news conference with Salehi on Thursday.

A Western diplomat in Vienna said Thursday that it would be very difficult to verify Iran's claims without knowing where the equipment originated.

Salehi acknowledged that Iran had kept some information about its nuclear purchases from the IAEA in the past, a potential violation of its commitment under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

"The important thing to note is that Iran had to do some of its activities very discreetly because of the sanctions that have been imposed on Iran for the past 25 years," he said, though he contended the actions were legal.

In reports to the IAEA board of governors in June and September, ElBaradei described numerous instances in which Iran had concealed activities from the IAEA. The disclosures, coupled with the discovery of the weapons-grade uranium, helped persuade the board last month to set the Oct. 31 deadline.

A second diplomat in Vienna, who is familiar with the inspection process, said that IAEA inspectors have found other potential hidden activities in recent weeks that have not yet been made public.

Some of the unreported activities were carried out at installations IAEA inspectors were allowed to visit for the first time in recent weeks, including at least one military facility, according to the diplomat.

The diplomat declined to provide additional details, but he said the suspect activities involved the centrifuge program and research into laser technology that could be used to enrich uranium.

Iran says that it wants to enrich uranium to provide fuel for reactors to generate electricity, not to manufacture material for nuclear weapons.

A team of senior IAEA inspectors is scheduled to return to Iran on Saturday to begin trying to verify the information contained in the dossier. ElBaradei said the process could take weeks.

Iran turned over the material as part of a promise made last week to ElBaradei and finalized Tuesday in meetings with the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany. Iran also pledged to suspend its uranium enrichment activities for an undetermined amount of time and to permit more wide-ranging inspections by the IAEA.

Salehi said that Iran intends to stand by its bargain to prove that it is not developing weapons. He said that Iran and the European countries had created an "axis of confidence," a play on President Bush's description of Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an "axis of evil."

ElBaradei said the handover of the records fell within the Oct. 31 deadline even though the verification process will take weeks. He also said that Iran has said that in the next few days it will provide a letter agreeing to the more intrusive inspections contained in an additional protocol to the nonproliferation treaty.

In an interview earlier in the week, ElBaradei stressed that Iran should own up to any "mistakes" in terms of its failure to report activities to the IAEA so that it can start with a clean slate.

"We have in the course of our inspections recorded failures by Iran, breaches of their obligations," he said. "If other failures were to be declared by Iran as part of the full disclosure, that is still better than having a question mark hanging over the Iranian program about whether it is for peaceful purposes."

ElBaradei said he was not certain whether the verification of Iran's disclosure statement would be completed in time for a Nov. 20 meeting of the IAEA board. But he said that he would have at least a preliminary report then.

Times wire services were used in compiling this report.

<http://www.latimes.com/la-fg-iran24oct24.1,1014641.story>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Times

October 24, 2003

Pg. 21

Who Is General Cao?

By William C. Triplett II

Next week, the White House staff has to make a decision: Is there any political risk in having your boss' picture taken with the Communist Chinese military officer most associated with the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and missile proliferation to terrorist countries over the past 20 years?

PLA Gen. Cao Gangchuan, Communist China's defense minister, will be visiting the United States beginning tomorrow. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has to see him; he's the official host. But the real question everyone wants answered is whether Gen. Cao is going to make the Oval Office. Beijing and its Washington collaborators are making a big push for Gen. Cao to see President Bush. There is precedent here, they argue, because President Clinton had invited the last Chinese defense minister to the White House even though that one had been in operational control of the PLA forces who killed so many Chinese young people at Tiananmen Square.

Gen. Cao is the PLA's weapons guy. He buys them, he makes them and he sells them. On the weapons selling side, he began as a staffer in the late 1970s, worked his way up to deputy division chief, division chief and then chief of the PLA's notorious "Office of Military Trade" by the early 1990s. From then on, with patronage from the Deng family, his career took off and under one title or another he has been the PLA's leading weapons official ever since. Let's look at the record of Gen. Cao's arms-smuggling exploits:

*In the 1980s, PLA companies were busy selling Silkworm missiles to Iran.

*In 1990, a Chinese arms company was caught busting the U.N. arms embargo on Iraq by smuggling rocket fuel.

*In January 1990, the Chinese and Iran signed a 10-year "military technology transfer agreement."

*In 1990, Sen. Joseph Biden, Delaware Democrat, pressed the State Department to explain PLA assistance to the Libyan chemical weapons complex.

*In 1991, British Intelligence discovered the Chinese were secretly building a nuclear weapons plant in Algeria.

*In 1992, CIA Director Robert Gates told Congress Syria was seeking chemical and biological warheads from China.

*In 1993, CIA Director James Woolsey named Chinese military companies as the leading poison gas suppliers to Iran.

*In 1994, German intelligence stopped another sanctions-busting Chinese rocket fuel export bound for Iraq.

*In 1994, the Wall Street Journal reported that America's Defense Intelligence Agency found Communist China was secretly assisting North Korea's long-range missile programs.

*In 1995, Defense News quoted from a CIA report detailing the PLA's extensive efforts to give Iran an indigenous missile capability.

*In 1995, South Korean intelligence reported China's Commission on Science and Technology for National Defense (COSTIND) was training hundreds of North Korean missile engineers.

*In 1996, China signed a \$4.6 billion arms deal with Iran.

*In 1997, German intelligence reported Chinese military companies were building a major poison gas plant in Iran.

*In 1997, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright pressed Beijing twice on Chinese arms sales to Libya that were in contravention to the U.N. sanctions.

*In 1997, Mrs. Albright revealed that Chinese military companies had transferred germ warfare-making equipment to Iran.

*In 1999, ABC News reported Syria was receiving Chinese medium-range, mobile-launch missile technology.

These are just representative samples. A true account, just from unclassified materials, would be book-length. In 1996, the CIA told the Congress that Communist China was the world's leading proliferator of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and so it remains. Since President George Bush took office in January 2001, the U.S. Government has sanctioned Gen. Cao's arms companies about 40 times for serious WMD and missile smuggling to terrorist countries.

Just last month, the State Department dropped the Helms Amendment (named for former Sen. Jesse Helms) on Communist China's leading arms company for repeatedly smuggling missile parts to Iran. Beijing's Foreign Ministry is screaming that will cost them billions of dollars in U.S. sales.

During all this time, Gen. Cao has been at "Ground Zero" on Chinese proliferation. He has done more than any other Chinese official, military or civilian, to make the world a more dangerous place. If he had a nickname, it would truly be "General Proliferation."

Foreign defense ministers come and go in Washington almost every week. None of the defense ministers from Asia have rated an individual meeting with President Bush in the Oval Office. This includes Japan, South Korea, the Philippines or Thailand, where we have formal military alliances of longstanding. It would certainly send the wrong message for Gen. Cao to be welcomed to the White House when our closest friends and supporters have not.

It is said that if you must sup with the devil, do so with a long spoon.

William C. Triplett II is a defense writer in Washington.

<http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20031023-074832-5695r.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

U.N. Pushing Unconventional Weapons Ban

By *EDITH M. LEDERER*

The Associated Press

Friday, October 24, 2003; 7:53 AM

UNITED NATIONS - Key Security Council nations met for the first time to discuss a new resolution aimed at preventing terrorists from getting nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, U.N. diplomats said.

Russia has drafted a proposal and the United States is working on one.

Diplomats said the five veto-wielding council members - the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France - met Thursday to discuss the Russian text and U.S. ideas.

President Bush, French President Jacques Chirac and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan agreed last month on the need to control unconventional weapons.

If terrorists were to obtain weapons of mass destruction, Bush warned, it would "bring sudden disaster and suffering on a scale we can scarcely imagine."

"Nations of the world must have the wisdom and the will to stop grave threats before they arrive," he said, calling on the Security Council to adopt a new anti-proliferation resolution.

Bush said he wanted the resolution to call on all members of the United Nations to criminalize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, enact strict export controls and secure sensitive materials within their own borders.

U.N. diplomats, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the aim of the U.S. and the Russian proposals was to keep weapons of mass destruction from getting into the hands of terrorists.

The Russian draft asks member states to report on compliance to the secretary-general who would make recommendations to the council while the United States appears more interested in creating a group or committee to monitor implementation of the resolution, the diplomats said.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A10624-2003Oct24.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)